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Abstract: The importation of Lacanian psychoanalysis into film theory in the 1970s and 1980s 
ushered in a new era of cinema scholarship and criticism. Figures including Raymond Bellour, 
Laura Mulvey, and Christian Metz are often considered the pioneers of applying Lacanian psy-
choanalysis in the context of film theory, most notably through their writings in Screen Journal. 
However, where French and British scholarship on Lacan and film reached its limits, American 
Lacanianism flourished. When Joan Copjec’s now classic essay “The Orthopsychic Subject: 
Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan” was published in 1989, the trajectory of Lacanian 
film theory would become radically altered; as Todd McGowan recently put it, the “butchered 
operation” on Lacan committed by Mulvey and (quoting Copjec) the “Foucaultianization” of 
Lacan under the auspices of Screen Journal were finally indicted in one gesture through Copjec’s 
critique. Copjec and McGowan’s unique American view of Lacan marks a pivotal point in the 
convergence of psychoanalytic theory and cinema studies; by seeking to wrest Lacan from his-
torist/deconstructionist theories of the subject, and by revisiting Lacan beyond the mirror stage, 
Copjec and McGowan can be said to have instantiated a resuscitation or even a renaissance of 
Lacanian theory in film studies in particular and in American scholarship more generally. In this 
essay, this renaissance of Lacanian theory is examined, focusing on the innovations these two 
American thinkers brought to psychoanalytic film theory and the multiple paths carved out into 
other disciplines that followed. First, a detailed summation of the contentions between screen 
theory and Copjec’s position is introduced, as well as McGowan’s assessment thereof. Then, the 
trajectory of psychoanalytic film theory after Copjec’s arrival is the focus, including the major 
innovations in her thought from cinematic subjectivity to sexual difference (most notably from 
Read My Desire) and the way her position spread to philosophy, ontology, and even race theory. 
Finally, the article identifies the limitations of Copjec’s and McGowan’s thought and seeks new 
possibilities through which we may continue to apply psychoanalysis to the cinema in the wake 
of these two important thinkers.
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Résumé : L’importation de la psychanalyse lacanienne dans la théorie du film au cours des années 
1970 et 1980 a apporté une nouvelle ère de recherche et de critique cinématographiques. Des figures 
comme Raymond Bellour, Laura Mulvey et Christian Metz sont souvent considérées comme étant les 
pionniers dans l’application de la psychanalyse lacanienne au contexte de la théorie du film, surtout 
dans leurs écrits pour le Screen Journal. Par contre, là où les recherches françaises et britanniques 
sur Lacan et la cinématographie ont atteint leurs limites, le lacanisme américain a prospéré. La 
publication en 1989 de « The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan », 
l’essai classique de Joan Copjec, a complètement changé la trajectoire de la théorie lacanienne du 
film; comme Todd McGowan l’a récemment exprimé, « l’opération massacrée » commise sur Lacan 
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par Mulvey et (citant Copjec) la « Foucaultisation » de Lacan sous les auspices de Screen Journal 
avaient finalement été accusées d’un seul coup par la critique de Copjec. Le point de vue unique-
ment américain de Copjec et de McGowan sur Lacan marque un tournant dans la convergence de 
la théorie psychanalytique et des études cinématographiques. En cherchant à arracher Lacan des 
théories historicistes/déconstructivistes du sujet, et en revisitant Lacan au-delà du stade du miroir, 
Copjec et McGowan ont instancié une ressuscitation, voire une renaissance, de la théorie lacanienne 
dans les études cinématographiques en particulier et dans les études américaines en général. Dans 
cet article, cette renaissance de la théorie lacanienne est examinée, mettant l’accent sur les inno-
vations que ces deux penseurs américains ont apportées à la théorie psychanalytique du film et les 
multiples chemins tracés dans d’autres disciplines subséquentes. Premièrement, un résumé détaillé 
des différends entre la théorie du film et la position de Copjec est présenté, ainsi que l’évaluation 
de McGowan à ce sujet. Puis, la trajectoire de la théorie psychanalytique du film après l’arrivée de 
Copjec est mise de l’avant, notamment les innovations importantes de sa pensée de la subjectivité 
à la différence sexuelle (particulièrement dans Read My Desire) et la manière dont sa position s’est 
propagée dans la philosophie, l’ontologie, même la théorie raciale. Finalement, l’article identifie les 
limites de la pensée de Copjec et de McGowan et cherche de nouvelles possibilités à travers lesquelles 
nous pourrions continuer d’appliquer la psychanalyse au cinéma après ces deux grands penseurs.
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INTRODUCTION
The details of Joan Copjec’s intervention into psychoanalytic film theory are by now 
well known and have been more than adequately dealt with at length by various authors: 
Todd McGowan (Real Gaze; Psychoanalytic Theory), Slavoj Žižek (Fright of Real Tears), 
Matthew Flisfeder (Symbolic; “Dialectical Materialism”), and Vicky Lebeau (Psycho-
analysis). Rather than repeat Copjec’s critique of the “Foucauldianization of Lacan” 
via the initial phase of psychoanalytic theory, there is another front to be considered, 
which has been, as far as I know, addressed in only one place up until now—namely, 
the question of why Copjec’s intervention has been so thoroughly neglected in film 
studies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Although “The Orthopsychic Subject” has 
been reproduced in introductory film theory texts and anthologies (Stam and Miller; 
Elsaesser and Hagener), it has very seldom been engaged with at the level of actual 
rigorous critique. As McGowan observes, “[A]lmost everyone is aware of it and yet 
almost no one pays attention to it” (Psychoanalytic Theory 67). “The Orthopsychic 
Subject” is not the only of Copjec’s major works that has been neglected, but, as Žižek, 
observes, “It is symptomatic how [Copjec’s] essay on the philosophical foundations 
and consequences of the Lacanian notion of sexual difference [“Sex and the Euthanasia 
of Reason”] is silently passed over in numerous feminist attacks on Lacan” (Barnard 
and Fink, 74 n14).1 Despite her intervention being widely known to exist, and even 
understood by many to be a crucial intervention into film theory, cultural studies, 
and ontology, what is it that sustains our lack of engagement with Copjec?
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Todd McGowan offers the most detailed and trenchant answer to this question, writing 
that film theory was so traumatized by Copjec’s intervention with “The Orthopsychic 
Subject” that it essentially repressed it. McGowan recounts the story of when Copjec 
delivered an early draft of “The Orthopsychic Subject” to an audience of film theorists 
at a conference in 1988, describing how
[al]though [Raymond] Bellour agreed to write an essay in response to Copjec, 
he found her argument so out of bounds that he changed his mind. Instead of an 
essay, he wrote a letter to the journal [October] explaining why he couldn’t write a 
response. In this brief letter, he contends that Copjec failed to appreciate the genuine 
contributions of both French and American psychoanalytic film theorists, and, what’s 
more, she failed to follow “the rules of the game.” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 65–6)2
In his letter, Bellour writes that Copjec’s text “lets one believe that they [the screen 
theorists] would all be incorrect in relation to a hypothetical truth of Lacan of which it 
[Copjec’s text] would be the possessor” (66). According to McGowan, “The existence 
of the letter in place of the essay is an absence indicative of a trauma” (66). Bellour 
attempts to disguise the truly radical import of Copjec’s intervention by “displac[ing] 
the true dimension of the conflict,” claiming that she is breaking some unspoken set 
of rules about what it means to engage with film theoretically (Žižek, Fright of Real 
Tears 3; original emphasis).
Žižek describes how “a properly philosophical scandal erupts when some philosophy 
effectively disturbs the very substance of the communal being, what Lacan referred 
to as the ‘big Other,’ the shared implicit set of beliefs and norms that regulate our 
interaction” (Fright of Real Tears 3; original emphasis). According this logic, Copjec’s 
intervention, as indicated by Raymond Bellour’s traumatic display, disrupted the very 
substance that bound together the big Other of psychoanalytic film theory—the 
implicit set of beliefs here being the insistence on the “Screen as Mirror” metaphor 
for cinema, and the reliance on the symbolic and imaginary at the expense of the 
real. By (re)introducing the real as the neglected concept of all preceding film theory, 
Copjec effectively indicts most if not all theoretical work that employed Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Thus, at least part of the lack of engagement with Copjec can be 
linked to its traumatic impact in the field.
Another component worth mentioning is the shift from film theory to “post-theory” 
and the cognitivist model in the 1990s. David Bordwell and Noël Carroll’s collected 
volume Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies develops a critique of film theory via 
what they term “culturalism” and “subject-position theory.” One of the major problems 
with Bordwell and Carroll is that their critique of the psychoanalytic model of film theory 
is launched exclusively against the first wave of psychoanalytic film theory—the very 
phase that Copjec herself critiques. In this volume, Stephen Prince claims that one of 
the major problems with the psychoanalytic model is the insistence on the scopic drive: 
“The problem with the ‘scopic drive’ is that it models viewing as a driven and reactive 
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process during which the viewer’s passion for looking is cathected by particular formal 
cues (for example, ‘fetishizing’ close-ups). The scopic drive implies a unifocal fixation 
within the viewer maintained by a match of formal features and inner fantasy” (77).
What is interesting about Prince’s criticism is that it is already addressed in Copjec’s 
essay, where she problematizes the notion of a “unifocal drive” (78), opting instead for 
the more dynamic relationship between the subject and the gaze. To begin with, the 
gaze does not belong to the subject or the apparatus in Lacan but arises as a feature 
of the subject’s external environs (more on this later). As well, the drive itself is not 
“unifocal” but split between itself and its representative, objet a, a nuance that neither 
screen theory nor post-theory recognized.
When Bordwell actually does engage with Copjec, critiquing her essay on Double 
Indemnity and film noir more general, his critique, however, is so misplaced that it 
is almost not worth mentioning; however, perhaps it is useful insofar as it illustrates 
the level at which the point is consistently missed in Copjec’s body of work.3 Bordwell 
critiques Copjec’s style of argumentation, claiming that it is flawed on account of its 
“associational reasoning” and that, essentially, Copjec commits grievous errors against 
positivism (Bordwell and Carroll 22). What Bordwell does not understand—in both 
critiquing Copjec’s associational reasoning and claiming that film theory is missing 
real embodied spectators—is how free association is itself the original medium 
through which the embodied analysand of psychoanalysis came into existence for 
Freud. Just as the analysand participated in free association, the embodied spectator 
participates in the image; she gets “caught in the image,” is implicated within it, just 
as she is caught in the unconscious web of signification, with all of its instances of 
parapraxes, slips, dreams, jokes, and alike. As McGowan puts it, “In order to sustain 
his assault on what he calls ‘subject-position theory’ and ‘culturalism’ in film studies, 
Bordwell must omit the one theory that fits within neither camp and that would 
therefore throw a wrench in his attack plan” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 67).4
Stephen Prince also claims that the application of psychoanalysis to film (even psy-
choanalytic theory in general) is overdetermined by its first principles, such as the 
Oedipal complex and fetishism. Prince has a bone to pick with what he alleges as the 
false universality with which psychoanalytic film theory employs Freud’s theories, 
ultimately failing to account for a real, empirical film spectator. The problem with 
Prince’s conception of Oedipus in particular is that it misses the crucial point of why 
Freud chose Oedipus in first place, as Lacan puts it in Seminar VIII: “The reason Freud 
found his fundamental figure in the tragedy of Oedipus lies in the fact that ‘he did not 
know’ he had killed his father and was sleeping with his mother” (100; emphasis added).
Rather than the cinematic spectator simply “playing off unresolved sexual and Oedipal 
conflicts,” as Prince diagnoses of psychoanalytic film theory, the properly Lacanian 
understanding of the Oedipal drama is contained in the subject’s epistemological failure 
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(Bordwell and Carroll 74). This “‘he did not know’” precisely indexes the foundational 
gesture of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, one that is missed in Prince and 
“post-theory” more generally, as much as it is in screen theory’s Foucauldianization of 
Lacan—the status of non-knowledge and its effect on the subject. Copjec insists that 
“[t]he reflexive circuit of the scopic drive does not produce a knowable object; it produces 
a transgression of the principle of pleasure, by forcing a hole in it” (Imagine 214; original 
emphasis). In critiquing psychoanalysis, and misapplying Lacan’s notion of the gaze 
in a Foucauldian hue, the crucial import of the unconscious in psychoanalysis is lost. 
Screen theory and post-theory have taken both the application of Lacan in the study of 
cinema, and the criticism thereof, so far off base that perhaps this is what sustains the 
lack of engagement with Copjec so thoroughly even today, given that psychoanalysis has 
thus far been misapplied and misapprehended in the realm of film theory for an entire 
half of a century. Copjec’s “return to Lacan” is very similar to Lacan’s “return to Freud,” 
which resulted in his expulsion from the International Psychoanalytic Association; 
Copjec, although not explicitly expelled, has been nonetheless excised from criticism.
Post-theory’s charge of psychoanalysis’s “missing spectators,” having been launched 
against the first wave of psychoanalytic film theory, was aimed at the wrong target. 
Rather than root out and finally locate the missing empirical body of the spectator, 
Bordwell, Carroll, and Prince should have instead searched for what Copjec herself 
brought (back) to the foreground of film theory—namely, what is missing in the 
spectator herself. The missing element in the spectator runs parallel with Copjec’s 
prognosis of negativity in cultural studies more generally, as she writes that “[t]o 
urge analysis of culture to become literate in desire, [is] to learn how to read what is 
inarticulable in cultural statements … desire must be articulated” (Read My Desire 14).
It is on these grounds that Copjec begins her veritable “return to Lacan,” indicting 
panopticism in cinema as championing visibility as a form of knowledge, all while 
neglecting the unconscious facets of the subject, invisibility, and non-knowledge. The 
“profound deafness” of engagement with Copjec has continued “well into the 2000s,” 
writes McGowan: “[Al]though critics acknowledge the existence of Copjec’s essay, 
no one engages with it until twenty years after its publication” (Psychoanalytic Theory 
66). As Žižek writes on the blurb on the back cover of Samo Tomšič’s The Capitalist 
Unconscious, “To be a Marxist today, one has to go through Lacan,” I claim that the 
only way to do film theory today is to go through Copjec.
THE GAZE
As Žižek observes,
Nowhere is the gap more between Theory and Post-Theory so obvious as apropos 
of the Gaze. Joan Copjec asserts that the proto-transcendental status of “partial 
objects” (Gaze, voice, breast …), which are the “condition of possibility” of their 
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organ-counterparts: Gaze is the condition of possibility of the eye, i.e. of our seeing 
something in the world (we only see something insofar as an X eludes our eye and 
“returns the Gaze”). (Fright of Real Tears 65)
The status of the gaze as it came to be in the psychoanalytic film theory of the 1970s 
and 1980s is not at all self-evident. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, psychoanalytic 
film theory enjoyed a relatively stable foothold in cinema studies; Laura Mulvey’s 
well-known essay, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Christian Metz’s The 
Imaginary Signifier, Jean Louis Baudry’s apparatus theory, and the works of so-called 
screen theorists Stephen Heath, Raymond Bellour, Colin McCabe, and others each 
had a stake in folding Lacanian psychoanalytic theory into cinema studies, predom-
inantly on the grounds of ideological interpellation via the apparatus, the formation 
of a cinematic subject, the championing of ideas like imaginary identification, and, 
of course, the male gaze.5
As is by now well known, this initial phase of film theory has its roots in an over-reliance 
on Lacan’s concept of the “mirror stage” in an essay developed in the 1930s detailing 
how the ego comes to be in infancy through mis-recognition of the image of oneself 
in a mirror. As McGowan notes,
This deception, as Lacan sees it, is essential to the function of the imaginary order, 
which has the effect of creating an illusory wholeness. The crowning achievement 
of the imaginary order is the subject’s ego, but in this essay and throughout his 
career, Lacan emphasizes that though the ego is a bodily ego, it is imaginary in 
both senses of the term—an illusion and an image. The aim of the mirror stage 
essay is accounting for the formation of the ego through a process of imaginary 
identification. (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 58)
As McGowan writes, for Mulvey, who relies on the mirror stage in same sense as 
Baudry, “The look of the male spectator at the female on the screen is akin to the look 
of the infant into the mirror” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 61). “The mirror,” however, 
as McGowan insists, “has nothing to do with the production of a subject, but this is 
how screen theory interprets and deploys the essay” (58–9).
As McGowan writes, “Copjec’s essay introduces Lacan’s category of the real into a 
psychoanalytic film theory obsessed with the imaginary and symbolic orders” (Psycho-
analytic Film Theory 64). Screen theory misrecognized the function of the imaginary 
as being formative of the subject: “Cinema, for [screen] theorists, concerns the power 
of the apparatus over the spectator and the power of the male over the female[,] … 
concerns itself with how the imaginary situation of cinema spectatorship furthers the 
ideological structure operating within the symbolic order” (65). The idea espoused 
by screen theory that “popular spectatorship is a political nightmare” (60) does not 
mesh with Lacan’s conceptualization of vision, as McGowan notes how “Lacan doesn’t 
align vision with a look of mastery as Screen theory does but instead focuses on 
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what disrupts our mastery when we look” (61). Thus, the strict correlation between 
the imaginary, the gaze, and mastery is falsely attributed to Lacan by screen theory.
It is important to remember that, for Copjec as for Lacan, “no position defines a reso-
lute identity” (Read My Desire 18). Although often charged for being too structuralist, 
and in spite of being deeply influenced by the structural linguistics of Saussure and 
Levi-Strauss’s anthropology, for Lacan, the concept of structure is itself marked by an 
inherent incompleteness—as Copjec puts it, an “incompleteness of every meaning 
and position” in relation to the structure itself (18). In terms of the imaginary, as 
Lebeau deftly notes, “The visible always raises the spectre of the hidden, the secret—a 
secrecy that … becomes inseparable from (structural to) the experience of looking 
as such” (58). Every act of looking thus, just as a position in a structure, is de-com-
pleted by a structurally necessary void. The gaze, instead of the screen theoretical 
notion of belonging to the spectator, is what is structurally missing from the visual 
field; it is what functions as a stain in the field of vision, “the limited resolution of our 
simulated world, as a sign of the ontological incompleteness of (what we experience 
as) reality itself ” (Žižek, Less than Nothing 743), the “pre-ontological level of fuzzy 
proto-reality” (744), and not what is harboured by the subject via the strictures of 
ideological interpellation.
The gaze as object for psychoanalytic theory is thus more properly understood as a point 
of incompleteness rather than the subject as marking the sublime point of ideological 
completion of meaning produced via the imaginary apparatus harboured by the gaze. 
As McGowan states, “[T]he symbolic is not a closed system but one whose internal 
structure marks the point at which the externality of the subject manifests itself within 
the signifying system, and it thus testifies to the system’s necessary lack of completion 
or wholeness” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 61). According to this formulation, the 
subject is that which does not fit properly within the system, cannot but disrupt the 
conformity to the law, and is not simply a project of an intractable ideological hold.
Panopticism, by contrast, claims a kind of a perfect visibility, one in which a fully 
visible subject is by default fully knowable, foreclosing the possibility of “invisibility 
and nonknowledge” (Copjec, Read My Desire 17), both of which “undermin[e] every 
certainty” (18). When Copjec critiques the editors of Re-Vision (1984), noting how 
the alleged completeness of dyad of eye and gaze through the “localization of the eye 
as authority” (16), she presents a structure of the subject that “guarantees that even 
her innermost desire will always be not a transgression but rather an implantation 
of the law, that even the ‘process of theorizing her own untenable situation’ can only 
reflect back to her ‘as in a mirror’ her subjugation to the gaze” (17).6 Thus, any form 
of difference launched against this closed circuit of the subject and the gaze would 
ultimately fail, as Copjec pithily states how “[d]ifferences do not threaten panoptic 
power, they feed it” (18).
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The only way to escape this structurally complete designation of the subjective circuit 
is by locating the points of failure belonging to both the subject and any apparatus 
of power. In this way, the proper object of analysis is not a uni-focal gaze localized 
in the subject’s eye, but a mise-en-scène of drives and their objects. For Lacan, “[A] 
subject (as $, a barred one) is the failure of its own actualization—a subject endeavors 
to actualize-express itself, it fails, and the subject is this failure” (Less than Nothing 
750; original emphasis). Or, as McGowan puts it in terms of the field of vision, “The 
subject is the effect of the impossibility of seeing what is lacking in the representation, 
what the subject, therefore, wants to see. Desire, in other words, the desire of repre-
sentation, institutes the subject in the visible field” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 64). 
What is lacking in representation, the impossible limit marking the subject’s failure, 
is the gaze itself as a stain in the fabric of material reality.
Whereas the “‘spendthrift’ Foucault” of screen theory that Copjec critiques carves a 
hole into the fabric of the image via panoptic power, establishing a vanishing point, a 
mise-en-abyme into which the subject’s gaze becomes parasitically invaded by ideol-
ogy, closed off via a matrix of power relations, trackability, and governmentality—a 
complete system of control descending on the subject as a product of a closed circuit 
of desire—the Lacanian model locates desire itself as arising from the stain as the 
impossible locus of failure as infinity located precisely where power, the law, knowledge, 
and visibility break down (Read My Desire 19). Thus, two vastly different film theories 
emerge: the former inheriting the Althusserian imperative of successful, complete 
interpellation while the latter proposes the point of incompleteness, the failure of 
every structure, as the point from which the subject’s desire emerges. As McGowan 
asserts on Copjec’s position, “[F]ilm confronts the subject with a real absence that 
remains irreducible to any imaginary or symbolic identification, and it is this absence 
that acts as the cause of the subject’s desire” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 64).
For psychoanalytic theory, the gaze is a stain belonging to externality, not one that is 
emitted by the eye of the spectator. As McGowan insists, “There is no look that can 
see the gaze, but there is no look without the gaze that it cannot see” (Psychoanalytic 
Film Theory 64). It is “[w]hen the gaze appears,” according to Copjec, that “vision is 
annihilated” (Imagine 195). The gaze as a point of failure marks the point of impos-
sibility out of which the subject emerges (McGowan, Psychoanalytic Film Theory 
64), “account[ing] for the disruptiveness of the real in cinematic spectatorship” (65). 
Copjec’s reformulation of the gaze, returning to Lacan’s own position from Seminar 
XI, reinvigorates the study of cinema and the latent possibilities it harbours for the 
subject at the level of desire as a disruptive faculty formative of every subject.
For contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers such as Žižek, McGowan, and Copjec, this 
first phase of psychoanalytic theory missed much of the Lacanian theory it purported 
to rely upon: it misapplication of the concept of gaze, its over-reliance on the symbolic 
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and imaginary at the expense of the real, and, as McGowan puts it, “even with the 
confines of the mirror stage essay itself, Screen theory performs a butchered operation 
on Lacan’s concept,” tending to ‘culturalize’ Lacan’s theory of the gaze, minimizing if 
not altogether obfuscating its ontological import (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 58). Film 
theory relied heavily on the mirror stage; for screen theory, “Gaze always retains … 
the sense of being that point at which sense and being coincide … Sense founds the 
subject—that is the ultimate point of the film-theoretical and Foucauldian concept 
of the gaze” (Copjec, Read My Desire 22), ostensibly producing a theory of the way 
the screen functions as an “[i]mage of the subject’s perfection”( 23).
Copjec summarizes the condition of this first phase of psychoanalytic film theory 
as operating a “Foucauldianization of Lacan” (Read My Desire 19), inverting and 
supplanting film theory’s reliance on the Screen as Mirror metaphor with a more 
apposite Lacanian analogy of “Mirror as Screen.” As McGowan puts it, “Screen theory 
on the whole views popular cinema as a grave political danger, precisely because, 
as Baudry and Metz notice, it tends to hide the act of production as it immerses 
spectators in a bath of images” (Psychoanalytic Film Theory 57). The product of this 
Foucauldianized psychoanalytic theory had its basis in subject formation through 
visibility and knowledge production, and an account of panoptic power as the site of 
production of the subject, culminating in an attenuated Lacanianism—a Lacanian 
theory devoid of theoretical insight into the drives and their objects, the real, and 
the way cinematic spectatorship actually offers an account of the possibilities to 
break free of the stranglehold of ideology rather than simply being produced as in 
Foucault’s account of panoptic power. In the opening chapter of Read My Desire, “The 
Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan,” Copjec unpacks the 
conditions upon which “a psychoanalytically informed film theory came to see itself 
as expressible in Foucauldian terms” (19).
In screen theory, “[t]wo ideas—the screen functioning as a mirror for the subject 
and the film suturing the subject into its signifying order—emerge as the primary 
takeaway from this initial burst of theorizing” (McGowan, Psychoanalytic Film 
Theory 57). What was consistently missed is the function of objet a as that which 
“is precisely what eludes the mirror image” (58) or the negativity inscribed in the 
spectator’s relation to the screen. Rather than the positive categories of visibility and 
knowledge following Foucault’s “assault on negation” (Copjec, “No: Foucault” 76) that 
typify the Foucauldian film theory passed off as Lacanian, the negativity of Freud’s 
original conception of the unconscious and the non-knowledge and the invisibility 
of the subject’s relation to the screen are to be understood as the properly Lacanian 
position of the film spectator.
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THE STRUT OF  VIS ION
Whereas “film theory interpret[s] … objectivity as a misrecognition fostered by the 
belief that the observer could indeed transcend his or her body and world and thus 
truthfully comprehend it” (Copjec, Imagine 184; original emphasis), Lacan focuses 
on the “the geometrical dimension [that] enables us to glimpse how the subject who 
concerns us is caught … in the field of vision” (Seminar XI 92; emphasis added). 
Lacan’s subject is caught in the matter of vision, not confined to the transcendental 
look of the eye but rather embedded or implicated in the scene in which she partakes. 
For Lacan, “[A]ll we see, we see from a certain perspective.” (Copjec, Imagine 184; 
original emphasis).
By threshing bare screen theory’s insistence on and misapplication of the mirror stage, 
and returning to Lacan’s concept of the gaze from Seminar XI, Copjec emphasizes 
Lacan’s “attempt to develop one of the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis: that 
of the drive” (Imagine 185). By relocating the gaze as a partial object of the drive, 
Copjec responds to post-theory’s charge of the “missing spectator” of psychoanalytic 
film theory. In Seminar XI, “Lacan proposes that Renaissance perspective provides 
the exact formula of the scopic drive, that is, it gives us the formula not of abstract 
vision, but of embodied seeing” (Imagine 184; original emphasis). The “place of the 
subject is the point of infinity (or vanishing point), projected into the world, not 
located outside it” (191). The act of seeing is thus not abstracted from the body of 
spectator, as Metz suggests when he concludes how “film is like the mirror. But it 
differs from the primordial mirror in one essential point: although, as in the latter, 
everything may come to be projected, there is one thing and one thing only that is 
never reflected in it: the spectator’s own body” (45). For Metz, and screen theory at 
large, “The spectator is absent from the screen as perceived, but also … present there 
and even ‘all-present’ as perceiver” (54; original emphasis), as though the body dis-
solves via the imaginary identification with the screen image.
In contrast with the Metzean formula that reads, “At every moment I am in the film by 
my look’s caress” (Metz 54), Copjec offers a description of the “strut of vision” as the 
material ligature between subject and object that supports the act of spectatorship as 
such. As Copjec insists, “The link between reality and the body is an essential datum 
of psychoanalysis, which nowhere lends support for a transcendent or noncorporeal 
constitution of reality” (Imagine 193).
Lacan turns to Renaissance perspectivism (arguably one of the aesthetic precursors 
to the cinema) to examine the underlying matrix between the seeing subject and the 
aesthetic object. As Copjec puts it, “The vanishing point and the horizon line that 
emerge in [projective geometry] are not to be taken … as illusions of perception, as 
objects we mistakenly see. They inscribe the eye of the viewing subject which has been 
projected from elsewhere into the visual field” (Imagine 189; original emphasis): “If 
© CRAS  2020
the space of the paintings is not flat, it is because it is shaped, rather, like a torus or 
an envelope that folds the eye of the observer back into the field it observes. Through 
Renaissance perspective, the observer is topologically inserted, or projected, into the 
observable space, where it becomes visible in the world” (189). This is the message 
of the parable of Petit Jean in Seminar XI (Copjec, Read My Desire).
Perspective, thus, is an embodied position, running counter to “[t]he thought/
extension dichotomy in [Descartes’s] theory[, which] was supposed to guarantee the 
independence of each term (pure thinking on one side, corporeality on the other), 
but Lacan argues that the Cartesian notion of extension has thought’s fingerprints 
all over it” (Copjec, Imagine 190). Read in this way, screen theory operates not only 
a Foucauldianization of Lacan but as well a vulgar Cartesianism. Psychoanalysis, by 
contrast, does not reduce the subject’s perspective to a “transcendental” locus out-
side of res extensia (Descartes), nor to the localized, extended organ belonging to 
the body of the subject (Foucault), but in the self-split scopic drive: “The perceiving 
subject cannot be represented as a mere point, a static and abstract position, but is 
representable only as the interval or gap separating the point from which we see and 
the one from which we are seen” (195).
For Copjec, this is what Lacan demonstrates in Seminar XI through his analysis of 
Renaissance perspectivism, “the existence of that pure distance which separates the 
perceiving subject from herself. This distance, which is necessary for representation 
to be possible at all, defines not the abstract subject film theory set out to deconstruct, 
but the embodied subject of the scopic drive” (Imagine 196). So, in reconsidering 
the gaze as belonging not to the subjective position but rather emanating from the 
object in the form of an impossible stain, and by understanding how the failure of 
the imaginary and symbolic is itself inscribed into the subject’s position as the real 
impossibility as the subject herself, Copjec is able to wrest an authentically Lacanian 
psychoanalytic film theory from the initial phase of “film theory, which consistently 
confuses the gaze with a single point or eye totally outside and transcendent to the 
filmic space, a point from which the space is unified or mastered … from … the 
gaze [as] a unifying or regulative category of my experience” (209). The gaze for 
Copjec is never to be mastered, but rather marks a traumatic excess in the field of 
vision: “The gaze looks at me, but I can never catch sight of it there where it looks; 
for there is no ‘there,’ no determinate location, no place whence it looks” (211). It 
is through the gaze as partial object of the drive, as indicative of the failure of the 
subject to apprehend the image—an infinity indexing the subject’s desire that is 
housed paradoxically in a small object, the objet a—that “the gaze is revealed to 
me … as embodied subject, though sensible indications” (211). The gaze is an Other 
that does not look back at me, does not offer the point of view with which to see 
myself through; but rather the gaze is the stain, a perspective that is itself perspec-
tive-less, a point of incompleteness.
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THE FEMININE  ACT
One of the most undertheorized features of Copjec’s entire body of work happens 
to be one of the more obscure and undertheorized features of Lacan’s late seminars; 
although many know and have even offered analysis of Lacan’s seminar on jouissance 
feminine, few have undertaken the project of actually understanding what Lacan means 
and what the ontological consequences are for the subject in this other, non-phallic 
satisfaction. Although it is a common mistake to think about feminine jouissance as 
a kind of mystical, divine experience occupying a place outside of the confines of the 
symbolic order, this could not be further from Lacan’s intentions. Žižek turns to Lars 
Von Trier’s Breaking the Waves in order to refute this common misreading of Lacan’s 
Woman as “beyond” the symbolic, insisting instead that the woman is even more firmly 
therein, “immersed in the order of speech without exception” (Barnard and Fink 60). 
Elsewhere, Žižek offers a description of the way in which “Lacan establishes a logic 
of feminine sexuality wherein a certain precise reaction of identification, desire, and 
jouissance constitutes not only a uniquely feminine organization of sexuality, but an 
epistemological position as well” (Less than Nothing 65). Although Žižek’s contribu-
tion here is valuable, he rarely offers a detailed account of feminine jouissance in his 
work, especially one that compares to the radical undertaking of just this in Copjec’s 
Imagine There’s No Woman.
On the very last page of Read My Desire, Copjec comments on the condition of the 
woman in contemporary theory, arguing, “It is now time to devote some thought 
to developing an ethics of inclusion or of the unlimited, that is, an ethics proper to 
woman. Another logic of the superego must commence” (239). This is just the project 
Copjec endeavours to undertake in Imagine There’s No Woman, namely, to theorize a 
feminine form of sublimation that had hitherto been overlooked in place of the mas-
culine. By turning her sights on feminine sublimation, Copjec ostensibly attempts to 
excise the (classical narrative of the) sublime out of sublimation in order to disinter 
the ethical from its seemingly indelible locus in the masculine logic of the sublime.
As Flisfeder already points out,
Much of Lacan’s early work focused on the levels of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, 
keeping the Real in the background. However, as many contemporary Lacanians 
will point out—Žižek, and Joan Copjec in Particular—beginning with his Seminar 
VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959–1960), Lacan’s trajectory started to move 
away from the Imaginary and the Symbolic, toward a more specialized focus on the 
Real as well as other provocative concepts like the Thing (das Ding); the “object” of 
psychoanalysis (the objet petit a); and, later on in his last seminars, on the “drive,” 
transference, fantasy, enjoyment (jouissance), and the sinthome. (Symbolic 15)
Copjec’s first step toward approaching a feminine form of sublimation is through the 
embodied subject in relation to drive, jouissance, and the sinthome: the body as a 
constellation of drives and their partial objects as the “partial incarnations of a lost 
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maternal One” (Imagine 55), the insistence on the drive as the ethical foundation of 
the body, and the body itself as a constellation of incomplete, failing drives with its 
objectal supplement housed in objet a. For Copjec, “[D]rive appears to us as a concept 
on the frontier between the mental and the somatic … as a measure of the demand 
upon the mind for work in consequences of its connection with the body” (185).
Copjec’s analysis takes us from the sublime as exception to the subject, the limit of the 
subject’s understanding, the mise-en-abyme—a vanishing point where subjectivity 
dissolves into the abyssal maw of das Ding—to an unlimited position, without excep-
tion, grounded in a mise-en-scène of (partial) drives and their objects, “in the thick of 
it,” rooted firmly in the subject as a body, though irreducible to the biophysiological 
body—one where desire supersedes demand and objet a trumps the Einziger zug of 
the signifier. Female sublimation can thus be read as the attempt to squeeze between 
the signifier and its unary trait, focalize the lack in the Other, and therefore deliver the 
subject to the universal-singular trait indexical to the incompleteness of reality as such. 
Feminine sublimation would thus stand simultaneously for that which is beyond the 
limits of knowledge; however, it is through a trace of the awareness of non-knowledge 
or, as Geneviève Morel puts it, apropos of the feminine masquerade as having the 
faculty of “metamorphos[e] a ‘not-having’ (the phallus) into a ‘being’ (the phallus)” 
(Barnard and Fink 83). Feminine jouissance is the other form of sublimation that 
attempts to upend the “historical transition” from Oedipal father to primal father, in 
which subjects “no longer have recourse to the protections against jouissance that 
the Oedipal father once offered” (Copjec, Read My Desire 182). Badiou would agree 
that “these protections have been eroded by our society’s fetishization of being … 
[which] commands jouissance as a civic duty” (182–3).
In place of the obligatory duty of “civic” jouissance, the feminine subject practises 
a jouissance of the body that does not capitulate to the demands of the signifier but 
nonetheless gets expressed in the hole inscribed in the symbolic. Neither is feminine 
jouissance the mystical dimension of the woman excepted from the confines of the 
symbolic, nor is it the pure place of void itself. Rather, the feminine subject is to be 
“opposed to ‘subjectivization,’” insofar as the former “is designated by an act that 
maintains the ontological priority of the void,” while the latter is already in the process 
of acquiring—perhaps even acquiescing—to the whims of the signifier (Flisfeder, 
“Dialectical Materialism” 385). As Copjec puts it, “The futurity of feminine jouissance 
is not merely something that may arrive, but something that in its not-yet-arriving, 
its futurity, acts now to unground any ground that might be attributed to the sexual 
as such” (“Sexual Compact” 35). What this formulation reveals is that, far from 
representing a radically free “floating” subjectivity lost in the jouissance of the real, 
feminine sublimation is linked with a prohibition, one that is paradoxically unlim-
ited, as it refuses to allow the sedimentation of the sexual form with its content, the 
metonymic faculty of objet a with its substantial “container,” but rather sublimates 
the drive via its fundamental substance: the cut that keeps the drive split between 
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itself and its object. Although “there is only one object of the drive in Lacan; the 
object a and the external object that has a particular ‘feature’ of not coinciding with 
itself ” (Copjec, Imagine 60), feminine jouissance names the identification with the 
cut that is a feature the drive’s non-coincidence, exposing the Janus-like face of objet 
a: the metonymic infinity of phallic jouissance and the “sinthomatic” adherence to 
void at the centre of the signifying chain. This is why Žižek insists that “the only 
true ethics is that of drive, of our commitment to the sinthome which defines the 
contours of our relation to enjoyment” (Žižek, Tarrying 60; original emphasis). 
Feminine sublimation is the avoidance of the infinity of metonymic desire, opting 
instead for metaphor (subject is void/$=Substance), standing for the stopping point 
of the drive, the point de capiton, “the quilting point” that reveals the feminine act 
of sublimation as non-all.
The cut that bifurcates la Femme stands for the “missing relation” on Lacan’s for-
mulae of sexuation between a and the barred Other S(Ø). As Ragland-Sullivan 
puts it apropos of how the woman “lack[s] a universalizing signifier … that would 
point to some essence of Woman, human beings who do not identify with having a 
penis, identify, rather, with the real which inserts a lack in the symbolic (Ø)” (66), 
or, as Zupančič reiterates, “One is a woman if one carries castration as a mask” 
(55; emphasis added).7 This formula for the disruptive potential of the subject was 
neglected by screen theory; the theorists of which never take the step toward sexual 
difference as an ontological problem. This is why, for Zupančič, “[t]rue feminism 
depends on posting sexual difference as a political problem, and hence on situating 
it in the context of social antagonism and of emancipatory struggle” (36). To truly 
speak ontologically about sexual difference, one must reconsider how something 
like the male gaze came to stand for the way in which cinema constructed its sub-
jects and turn instead to Lacan’s understanding of the way in which the “[w]oman 
has a relation with S(Ø) and it is already in that respect that she is split, that she is 
not-whole, since she can also have a relation with Φ” (Seminar XX 81); the woman 
is the subject of excess, fully “immersed in the order of speech without exception” 
(Barnard and Fink 60; original emphasis).
In terms of feminine sublimation, Copjec conceives of the “process which gives us 
access—through the intervention of the symbolic—to libido. Simply put, we would 
have no affects without symbolization … That which does not exist for the subject, 
non-being, is converted by the symbol of negation to an experience of radical other-
ness” (“No: Foucault” 93). Against the ruptural-mystical sublime commonly misread 
as non-phallic jouissance, Copjec’s sexed-being demystifies the feminine act; rather 
than being a case of radical otherness grounded in an exception, feminine sublimation 
augurs a path through “the contradiction of the symbolic space that appears because 
of the constitutively missing signifier, and of what appears at its place (enjoyment)” 
(Zupančič 42; original emphasis). Feminine sublimation turns the subject protrep-
tically to the real substance of enjoyment.
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There is a clear separation between Copjec’s embodied subject and her insistence on 
sexed-being against the neutered being implicit in gender theory, and the subject 
that the first phase of psychoanalytic film theory produced as “a subject that no body 
could be: a monocular subject of pure, abstract seeing, who occupied no space, was 
subject to no temporal fluctuations, and laid claim to no sexual identity, except—
notoriously—by default” (Imagine 180). After Copjec, there can never any longer be 
a missing spectator in film theory.
LIMITATIONS , POSSIBILITIES
One cannot help but notice a certain flaw in the way Lacanian theorists so often 
speak of terminal points: that point at the end of analysis, Lacan’s famous analytic 
Pass, the Act, and so on. Do these ends not sometimes leave us unsatisfied as to the 
actual potential of psychoanalytic theory to provide ground for the revolutionary 
act? Perhaps a certain utopian drive is latent in the psychoanalytic project, which 
can be detected in Copjec’s ontology. For instance, does not her claim as to how “the 
futurity of feminine jouissance … in its not-yet-arriving … acts now to unground 
any ground that might be attributed to the sexual” (“Sexual Compact” 35; emphasis 
added) ring with a similar timbre as Walter Benjamin’s notion of divine violence as 
the “unalloyed violence … the sign, seal but never the means of sacred execution” 
(Benjamin 300)?
Read in this way, Copjec’s notion that the ungrounding faculty of feminine jouissance 
seems to register in the dimension described by Badiou as “speculative leftism.” For 
Badiou, “[S]peculative leftism imagines that intervention authorizes itself on the 
basis of itself alone; that it breaks with the situation without any other support than 
its own negative will … fascinated by the evental ultra-one and it believes that in the 
latter’s name it can reject any immanence to the structured regime of the count-as-
one” (Being and Event 126). Does Copjec’s feminine subject promise to unground 
any ground?
The answer may be found in Duane Rousselle’s recent critique of Copjec’s ontology. 
According to Rousselle, “Copjec’s argument is that sex is always sexuation … that sex 
always refers to the impossible relation or gap between and within linguistic existence” 
(36). It is true that such definitions pepper Copjec’s work: “[S]ex is the stumbling block 
of sense” (Read My Desire 204); “[S]ex is the structural incompleteness of language” 
(206); the “structural incompleteness of language is “the only guarantee we have 
against racism” (209). For Rousselle, it seems that Copjec’s “noumenalization” of sex 
functions as an Archimedean point that, rather than rooting the subject to the negative 
ligature of sexed-being as non-all, has the effect of “reduc[ing] the thing-in-itself to 
the correlate of existence … knott[ing] the thing-in-itself into the human world of 
language, not as language but nonetheless within language,” therefore unable to “solve 
the problem of externality” (Rousselle 36; original emphasis).
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Copjec’s insistence on the “unabsorbable negation” of the real as sexual difference (Read 
My Desire 10), indexing how “[s]ome elision or negation of its powers writes itself 
in language as the lack of metalanguage” (9), poses a problem for Copjec’s ontology; 
from this vantage, it is not simply language that confines the subject to a subjective 
frame, and thus prohibits sex, but the fact that sex itself is inscribed into language 
through negativity that causes the prohibition. Copjec’s entire ontology of the subject 
hinges upon one noumenal object, which happens to be sex as the stumbling block to 
reason. In this way, we begin to approach the questions of pre-critical, naive realism.
What can perhaps offer a salve to this problem—or perhaps protract it a bit further—
and bring us back to film theory is the notion of suture, which was once a valuable 
topic in film studies. Suture theory provides the subject a localization of the void as a 
mathematical point; through the matheme, we can refind the objective status of the 
void carved out by objet a, and thereby track desire as it is articulated through the 
symbolic. Miller, following Frege, understands the necessity of the Zero as the sign of 
the not-identical to One essential for the passage from One to Two as “the first non-real 
thing in thought” (Miller 44), and it is precisely suture as this non-real thing in thought 
which Copjec’s subject “sublates” through the act of sublimation as explained above: 
“That which does not exist for the subject, non-being, is converted by the symbol of 
negation to an experience of radical otherness” (Copjec, “No: Foucault” 93). Suture 
thus stands for the act of sublimation that installs the radically Other as a feature of 
the subject herself. The logic of the suture can tell us how subjects are stitched into 
the scene of the social through a necessary negativity. Suture in this sense names the 
locus of lack embedded in the subjective relationship with the symbolic interface, 
offering us a glimpse at what Badiou, paraphrasing Rimbaud, calls the “the place and 
the formula” (Badiou and Cassin 46). Suture as lack functions here as a matheme, as 
a way to domesticate the failure that is the subject’s impossibility of knowing itself; it 
is the lost bit of 1970s’ film theory that must be repurposed for today, allowing us to 
rethink the interface between the spectator and screen via failure, lack, and the cut 
part and parcel of the drives and their objects.
Copjec’s drive-constellation concept of subjective embodiment may provide a 
much-needed hue of practicality to the oft-perceived sublimity of Badiou’s notion of 
Event. Is Badiou’s Event a grand moment of rupture or a subject that takes “the form 
of a body whose organs treat a worldly situation ‘point by point’” (Badiou, Logic 399)? 
If we consider the latter, Copjec’s configuration may indicate how Badiou’s “points” 
and “organs” interact: the inside/outside relationship between “organ” and “point” 
is what Copjec describes as the “seat of sex” (Imagine 29). The subject is always “in 
the thick” of the worldly situation, and never transcendentally abstracted therefrom; 
the twisted, mobius-like logic of the extimate reveals how abstraction itself is part 
of reality as the failure of the drive structure, which the cinematic screen is able to 
represent to the subject through fantasy. Copjec’s passage from mise-en-abyme, the 
vanishing point of the sublime as an exception grounding the masculine subject, to 
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the subject of mise-en-scène as a constellation of drives and their partial objects, one 
without limitation, a subject whose very impossibility of knowing themselves, and 
impossibility of being in unison with itself, marks the new ethical terrain carved out 
by Copjec’s ontology. It is this subject, a real embodied subject as spectator, marked by 
an epistemological limit and an ontological limit, defined by the contours of jouissance 
and occupying the negative space indicated by suture, that offers radical potential 
against the masculine formulation of the sublime as exception, against a ruptural 
sublime (against the grand narrative of a sublime Event) and toward the feminine 
iteration of objet a as an ethics without exception. In this way, we approach a more or 
less Fichtean solution to the problem of an ethical subject; “if our world is the sensible 
manifested material of our duty” (Bowman and Estes 105), then the aesthetic and 
the ethical are indelibly bound to one another. The feminine act of sublimation, via 
feminine jouissance, marks not a mystical beyond of the symbolic order but rather 
shares an affinity with one of Badiou’s les points qua matheme, denoting the structural 
incompleteness of the subject and the object, marking the “deontological” twist at 
the centre of being as the ethical shape carved out by the drive that Copjec locates.
Anthony Ballas studied philosophy, English, and religious studies at the University of Colorado 
at Denver, where he currently teaches as a graduate student. His work focuses mainly on 
continental philosophy, Lacanian psychoanalysis, literature, and film. He is currently editing 
a collection on cinema and liberation theology.
NOTES
1 Žižek, whose work has relied heavily on Copjec’s intervention into both film theory and 
sexual difference (even when it is not acknowledged), understands Copjec as one of the 
few theorists who claims Lacan as the “ultimate background” of her thought, whereas 
film theorists such as Kaja Silverman and Laura Mulvey, although they do engage with 
Lacan, do so only insofar as Lacanian concepts are employed to bolster support of their 
other theoretical implications (Žižek, Fright of Real Tears 2).
2 It was McGowan (Psychoanalytic Film Theory) who noticed the correlation between 
Bellour’s phrase and Jean Renoir’s 1939 film Le règle du jeu.
3 It is interesting to note that in his discussion, Bordwell also indicts Raymond Bellour, 
who was himself Copjec’s pseudo-interlocutor at Screen Journal (Bordwell and Carroll 
22–3).
4 In this way, not only does Bordwell fail to engage with Copjec’s more crucial theoret-
ical interventions into film theory but so too fails to recognize that in his search for 
the “missing spectator” of psychoanalytic film theory, he doesn’t realize that Copjec is 
herself a real spectator.
5 For a thorough account of this history, see McGowan (Psychoanalytic Theory; Real Gaze) 
and Lebeau.
6 Henry Krips, another of the few scholars to actually engage with Copjec, claims that 
Copjec has misunderstood how panoptic power and the gaze actually function in 
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Foucault’s work. Krips (96) cites Foucault from The History of Sexuality (159) on how 
a “[d]ifferent economy of bodies and pleasures” presents a “way out” of the deadlock 
of interpellation. On this very same line of Foucault, Copjec recently describes this 
economy as a “qualitas occulta [that] is nowhere to be found.” (“No: Foucault” 93).
7 One should add, as Žižek does following Jacques-Alain Miller, “[a] mask which conceals 
nothing” (Less than Nothing 46).
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